The Folly That Was Braden Looper

One of the most appalling things about the Jeffrey Hammonds signing – apart from the direct, catastrophic consequences of misjudging his talent – was the revelation that the front office at the time had no idea that elevation affected the flight of a baseball, or how to adjust for it, or were aware of the existence of home/road splits. More troubling still was the existence of the Brewers High-A affiliate, the High Desert Mavericks who played in Adelanto California at an elevation of 2,871 ft.

I mean, “High Desert” is right there in the name.

Anyway, in 2009 Doug Melvin and the Brewers saw fit to sign Braden Looper to fill a spot in a rotation.  Looper was converted into a starter by Dave Duncan’s wizardry in 2007 at the age of 31. He’d spent the previous 8 years as a pretty effective relief pitcher. He was OK for the Cardinals, but just OK (at best). In 2007 he had a 4.94 ERA (4.74 xFIP, so actually pretty horrible) and a 4.16 ERA/4.31 xFIP the following year. The best thing you can say about him is that he ate a ton of innings, approaching 200 each of his last 2 years as a Cardinal. 

There’s something else interesting about Looper. He’s mentioned in Tango/Lichtman/Dolphin’s The Book, as follows:

“Teams tend to spend a good deal of time worrying about the need for left-handed relief specialists (indeed, we have devoted an entire section discussing this topic), but one should also be aware of the usefulness of right-handed relief specialists – Pitchers who are above average (or even quite good) against right-handed hitters, but well below average against lefties. A good example would be Braden Looper, whose wOBA skill against right-handed hitters has been a solid .302 but who gets shelled to the tune of .360 when facing lefties. Pitchers like Looper can be even more useful than their left-handed counterparts, due to the greater likelihood of finding consecutive right-handed hitters in the lineup. As as many Mets fans are aware, Looper should probably not be used as an exclusive closer (i.e., used regardless of the handedness of the batters coming to the plate). Even a poor overall lefty would be more effective than Looper versus a LHB.” (Page 178, if you haven’t read The Book you really should.)

The Brewers put a good offense on the field in 2009 as they scored the 3rd most runs in the NL behind the Phils and Rockies, and let’s face it, the Rockies don’t count. They also allowed more runs than anyone but the Nationals. This should all be sounding a bit familiar. In 2009 only one Brewer starter (Yovani Galardo) had an ERA under 5.00. Two Brewer starters had ERAs over 6.00.* Braden Looper led the staff with 194.2 IP, and there are probably a few morons out there who think he wasn’t that bad on account of his 14-7 W-L record. He was terrible, and part of the reason he was terrible was simply the fact that no one realized his strengths and weaknesses. Looper was ROOGY. Everyone knew this (or should have known this) and there’s some pretty good evidence that the Cardinals at least suspected this as in Looper’s last 2 years as a Cardinal he faced lefties in only 43% of PAs.  In 2009 as a Brewer he faced lefties in 47% of plate appearances.

For his career righties hit .253/.307/.368 off of Looper. He was quite effective. Over a sample of 2204 Pas, lefties hit .297/.359/.477. For reference, Don Mattingly’s career slash line is .307/.358/.471. Basically every lefty was Don Mattingly against Looper for his entire career.

For the Brewers in 2009 righties hit .278/.325/.468 against him, which isn’t great to begin with, but lefties just destroyed the guy to the tune of .302/.365/.544. Ryan Braun’s career slash line is .314/.376/.569. He allowed 39 HRs, which is amazing. 

The Brewers ponied up 5.5 million for him and an additional 6 mill for Trevor Hoffman**.  Together they made up 14% of the Brewers’ payroll that year. Add in Jeff Suppan’s 12.75 mill and the three of them made up 30% of the team’s total salaries.

It’s not a lot of money in a vacuum, but it was such a flawed decision from the start.  Signings like that are the kind of things that bug me. The Suppan signing was a disaster. The Wolf signing was less so, but it’s worth mentioning that Wolf was a free agent the same year as Looper, and was a better pitcher, and was paid just 5 mill by the Dodgers (and gave them 214 IP with a 3.23 ERA). That 2009 pitching staff was a train wreck, and one of the primary reasons it was a train wreck is because Doug Melvin expected to get 200 innings out of a guy who turns every left-handed batter into Don Mattingly.

If there’s one area where the Melvin administration has failed miserably it’s in getting starting pitching. They’ve failed to draft high-ceiling prospects, they’ve failed to develop anyone worth a damn outside of Gallardo, and outside of the “duh” category (Sabathia, Greinke), they are seemingly incapable of finding useful pitchers on the open market, though I suppose Lohse has been OK to this point.

I don’t like it when I outguess the front office. They’re supposed to be smarter than I am. We all knew that Suppan would be terrible. Same deal with Looper. When the fans are better at picking personnel than the GM, that is the single biggest indictment of the GM.  

*2013: Currently only 2 pitchers are under 5.00 (Yo and Lohse) and 2 have ERAs over 6. Yay.

**I include Hoffman because it’s always a waste to pay for “proven closers”, especially old ones with no stuff. 

Was hiring Ken Macha the 9th worst thing Doug Melvin has ever done?

Ryan thinks so. His post is in bold. 

9) Hiring Ken Macha as manager.

One of the hardest things any general manager has to do is to hire a field manager and obviously Melvin hasn’t hit a home run with any of his three managerial hires.

I grant you that I write on a blog where our sole purpose is to nitpick managers, but I think it actually seems really easy, since the baseline for hiring a manager is “terrible”.

Still, at least Ned Yost accomplished the successful “breaking-in” of those 2000-05 draftees

He was a tactical disaster. Did you know that he had Chris Getz and his .250 OBP lead off for the Royals yesterday?  .250 OBP. 

and Ron Roenicke has a career 197-172 record.

RRR career WP% – .534

Macha – .540

The Ken Macha hire was basically a disaster from start to finish. Yes, it’s true he wasn’t given much in the way of a starting rotation to work with,

Since this is a post about Doug Melvin why don’t we take a look at said pitching personnel?

Braden Looper – 5.22 ERA

Yo – 3.73 ERA

Suppan – 5.29, but he was just one pitch away from like 3.4. Or so I’m told.

Parra – 6.36

Bush – 6.38

Villanueva – 5.34.

Ron would have best-buddied Looper into a 4.00 for sure though.

and he was tactically more in line with my thinking than either of the other two,

Hey, we agree!

but his inability to run a functional clubhouse ultimately kept him from being given the chance with a good rotation in 2011.

So…shouldn’t this mistake be “firing Ken Macha?”

What makes the hire worse was that he came to Milwaukee with a reputation for being hard to get along with,

The 2009 BP annual has this to say on the subject:

“Failures in clubhouse communication (some of them involving his once and future catcher, Jason Kendall) dogged Macha during his time in Oakland; Brewers fans will have to hope that his newfound autonomy doesn’t prompt him to unleash a flurry of bunt signs restrained during four years under Billy Beane, on an unsuspecting National League.”

I hate Jason Kendall too.

 but that didn’t seem to matter. At the end of the day, 2009 and 2010 represent tremendously blown opportunities for contention and Ken Macha was at the helm for those two debacles.

Spoken like someone who believes in pitcher wins. 

Cards v. Brewers, Just the Facts

1. The Brewers have played 42 games. 10 of those (23.8%) have been against the 1st place Cardinals.

2. The Cardinals have hit 80 singles in the 10-game match-up. The Brewers have hit 73.

3. The Cardinals have 24 extra-base hits. The Brewers have just 18.

4. The Cardinals have 26 walks. The Brewers have 18.

5. The Cardinals have grounded into 8 double plays. The Brewers have grounded into 14.

6. The Cardinals put runners in scoring position 93 times. The Brewers put runners in scoring position 74 times.

7. The Cardinals got a hit with runners in scoring position 34 times for a BA with RISP of .366.

8. The Brewers got a hit with runners in scoring position 18 times for a BA with RISP of .243.

It may have seemed like the Cards nickel-and-dimed the Brewers to death this season, but they were just better offensively. They were also better pitching-wise but you don’t really need a big breakdown to see that.

Is Rickie Weeks a Good Player in a Prolonged Slump,

Or is he a bad player who (hopefully) has occasional hot streaks? For most if his career he’s been a good player, and occasionally a great player. I’ve been hoping that he’d snap back to that level of production and telling myself that it’s early. Thing is:

  1. It’s not that early anymore, and
  2. Given what we know of last year, we almost have the dreaded “large sample size”, and
  3. Rickie’s been hurt a lot, which doesn’t help you when you age, and,
  4. Rickie’s kinda old, and
  5. Rickie doesn’t have the best body type and has always been stretched at 2nd base, and
  6. He’s slower.

Yes, players do slump for more than a year. Yes, most players are not washed up by their 30th birthday, but the VAST majority of players never slump for a year, and some guys are essentially done when they’re 30.

I said on Twitter the other day that when I watch Weeks I’m reminded of Carlos Baerga and Jose Vidro (though they’re switch hitters, which is important for later). They were big-bodies 2nd baseman who hit for some power, and saw pretty steep declines around the age of 30. Baerga especially aged extremely poorly partially due to injuries.* A more optimistic comp who shows up in both PECOTA and on B-Ref’s comps list is Kelly Johnson, who has experienced Weeksian slumps in his age 29 and 30 seasons but who has, at least so far, bounced back this year:

2011: .222/.304/.413

2012: .225/.313/.365

2013: .275/.361/.471, (32 games)

Career until 2010: .269/.352/.447

So maybe there’s hope there, but then again, maybe not. Johnson is an interesting character in his own right. He had the same career year as Rickie Weeks in 2010 when Weeks was the most valuable 2nd baseman in baseball. Johnson had a 5.4 fWAR, 3rd among 2nd baseman only to Weeks and Cano at 5.8. He then experienced a precipitous decline. Here’s a side by side of Weeks and Johnson since 2007:

Johnson                               Weeks

2007                       3.3                                          3.1

2008                       2.3                                          2.3

2009                       .6 (106 games)                   1.3 (37 games)

2010                       5.4                                          5.8

2011                       1.7                                          3.4

2012                       .5                                            1.1

They look pretty close over the course of their careers, and Johnson is off to a nice start this year, (and read this) but there’s one huge difference between the two. Kelly Johnson bats left/throws right. This season he has feasted on RHP, hitting .288/.369/.534 in 84 Pas versus .241/.343/.310 against LHP. Johnson has not always had such extreme splits, but as players get older the difference often grows. Johnson, by virtue of his left-handedness, can probably survive this for quite a while as most pitchers (and people) are right-handed and as you can see, the Rays have been good about limiting exposure to the weaker side.

Rickie Weeks isn’t exactly raking against lefties, but he’s noticeably (over .200 points of OPS) better against them**. In 41 Pas against LHP Weeks is hitting .212/.366/.364 with 1 HR and 2 doubles. In 108 Pas against RHP he’s hitting .170/.278/.245. Looking at batted ball data the contrast is even starker for Weeks. He doesn’t have a good BABIP in general (.273 v. L, .246 v. R), but while both are lower than his career .303, there is more reason to believe that he’s been unlucky against lefties than righties. His LD% against lefties is a very solid 26.1%. 20% of his flyballs have left the yard against lefties. Against righties his GB% is four points higher, his LD% is 6.5 points lower, he hits way more infield flies, and only 6.7% of flyballs have left the yard. I’m not sure how to look up contact rate splits on Fangraphs so maybe someone can help me out there, but we have enough to conclude that Weeks has been better in almost every measure against lefties, and by a fairly substantial amount.

Let’s assume for a second that Johnson and Weeks are truly similar, or, at least were until very recently.  They had similar peak seasons, similar ascents, and similar declines. They both had quick bats in their youths and hit everyone pretty well. But when you get old and your bat slows down, it suddenly starts to matter which side of the plate you stand on. The big advantage in being a lefty is simple demographics. Johnson has obviously been better than Weeks this year, but just look at the different ways they‘ve been exposed to their weaknesses.

Another common Weeks comp is Dan Uggla, a right-handed hitter. He’s hitting .197/.309/.409 in 36 games this year. He has an OPS of 1.002 in 38 PAs against LHP and a .628 OPS in 111 PAs v. RHP. If you reverse those opportunity numbers you have an All-Star, but with this breakdown in the aggregate you basically have Yuni. A low OBP guy “with some pop.”

If you want my prescription on possibly saving Weeks, put him in a strict platoon for a while. Put him in situations where he can succeed. This will limit his time for a bit, and I actually don’t even care if his platoon partner is a lefty or not, but if your goal is to build his confidence, this is a way to do it. If you want to get the most out of him, for now, this is the way to do it.

I’m not sure if Weeks is a bad player who will have occasional hot streaks, or a good player who will have occasional slumps at this point, but his comps and the side of the plate he stands on suggests that he may now be the former. That’s not a good thing, but at least there’s a way to deal with it.

*He had a minor comeback from 2002-2005, driven mostly by a crazy year for Arizona in 2003, but mostly he was washed up after 1999.

**Over his career this is truer of Weeks than of Johnson. Weeks has always hit lefties better, Johnson historically is more balanced.

Let’s Catalog the Intentional Walks of Future All-Star Yuni B

As we all know, teams that have walked Yuni B are 0-9. The strategy has never led to victory ever. But has it worked in-game? I happened to be looking at Yuni’s stats because, well, that’s basically all I do* and noticed that the first time he was walked intentionally on May 23rd of 2007 against the Devil Rays, it actually worked out for the Devil Rays.

It happened in the top of the 6th inning with the Mariners already up 3-1 and Casey Fossum pitching for the Devil Rays.  The Mariners had already scored once in the inning when Kenji Johjima doubled to drive in Jose Guillen. Adrian Beltre ended up on 3rd and Yuni was walked to load the bases with one out. Jose Lopez promptly grounded into an inning ending double play.

So walking Yuni actually worked, though the Devil Rays still lost the game. Here’s the rest.

June 8th, 2007, Mariners 6, Padres 5.

When was he walked: In the top of the 7th with the Mariners already up 5-1. There were 2 outs meaning Yuni was walked not to set up a double play, but to get to the next batter. This was an interleague game so pitcher Miguel Batista was up next.

Did it work: Batista grounded out, so at least for this inning, yes it did.

June 12th 2007, Mariners 5, Cubs 3.

When was he walked:  In the top of the 13th inning with the score tied 3-3. Will Ohman retired the first 2 batters but Jose Vidro followed with a double. The Cubs then walked Yuni on purpose to get to Willie Bloomquist, who promptly singled to drive in Vidro. Ohman then intentionally walked Ichiro to get to the pitcher’s spot where the Mariners pinch hit Jamie Burke for Eric O’Flaherty. He singled and drove in Yuni.

Did it work: Hell no.

August 3rd, 2010, Royals 3, A’s 2.

When was he walked: In the top of the 9th of a tie game. Alex Gordon reached, and made 2nd on an error. Mitch Maier Yosted him over to 3rd. Yuni was then given a free pass to set up the double play.

Did it work: Nope. Gregor Blanco hit a weak grounder to short but the A’s couldn’t turn two and Gordon scored the eventual winning run. It didn’t necessarily fail, I suppose as Yuni was actually cut down at 2nd, but I don’t think we can count it as a victory since a non-Yuni player was allowed to bat.

April 7th, 2011, Brewers 4, Braves 2.

When was he walked:  In the bottom of the 7th with the Brewers already ahead 4-2. Yuni was actually walked immediately after Casey McGehee grounded into a double play. This was a really strange decision. The bases were loaded and McGehee grounded into a 4-2-3 double play leaving runners on 2nd and 3rd. Jonny Venters, a lefty was pitching for the Braves and he put Yuni on to face Nyjer Morgan.

Did it work: Yes, Nyjer struck out with the bases loaded.

May 18th, 2011, Brewers 5, Padres 2.

When was he walked: In the top of the 6th with the score tied 2-2. Mark Kotsay was on 2nd after driving in Fielder with a double to tie the game. Casey McGehee reached third. Yuni was then walked to load the bases with 1 out, setting up a potential double play.

Did it work: No, no it did not. Jonathan Lucroy was plunked on the first pitch from Ernesto Frieri driving in the go-ahead run. Gallardo was on deck and he and Weeks subsequently struck out.

May 28th, 2011, Brewers 3, Giants 2.

When was he walked: In the bottom of the 9th. You already can probably tell that it didn’t work.

Did it work: Hell no. With the game tied Guillermo Mota allowed a lead-off single to Braun. Prince followed that with an infield single (ha!). Casey then grounded out, but did manage to move the runners up 90 feet. Yuni was walked to set up the double play, and Lucroy pinch hit for Nieves.  Braun scored on what was almost definitely a suicide squeeze from Lucroy (bunt to weak 2b) and everyone was safe as the winning run scored.

April 8th, 2013, Brewers 7, Cubs 4.

When was he walked:  In the top of the first with 2 outs, the Brewers had, by this point, already put up a four spot. Yuni was walked after a bases-clearing double by Maldy to get to Marco Estrada.

Did it work: Yes, but the damage had already been done. Marco struck out.

April 17th, 2013, Brewers 4, Giants 3.

When was he walked: In the bottom of the 9th with the score tied. Yeah, this again.

Did it work: Nope, but it wasn’t a bad move. Due to some fielding incompetence by the Giants the Brewers ended up with runners on 2nd and 3rd with only 1 out and the pitcher’s spot on deck. Santiago Casilla put Yuni on to load the bases and Blake Lalli hit a game winning single.

So that’s it! Final count:

Why: Yuni was put on to set up the double play 5 times, however this strategy only resulted in a double play once, the very first time it was tried. Teams walked Yuni simply to avoid him on 4 occasions, and this was successful 3 times, twice with pitcher batting next, and once with Nyjer Morgan batting next.

Success overall: Walking Yuni intentionally ultimately succeeded (meaning accomplished what the opponent intended) 4 times and failed 5 times, but really, I think we can all agree that the act itself is always a failure.

*besides looking at Rickie Weeks’ stats and Scooter Gennett’s stats.

Why I Screamed On Twitter Earlier This Morning

Finally caught up on the Fringe Average podcast, it really is tough luck that Smoak and Montero and Ackley all didn’t work out. Let’s see, almost to work, probably not time for another podcast….Ah! it’s 8:15, TMJ will have on Brewers 360, maybe they’ll replay a Uecker home run call, that’s always fun…Oh, Greg Matzek is talking to Ron this morning:

RRR: “Yeah, the pitchers go through their bunting, their squeeze plays, hitting to move runners over, and then they get their home run time. Yovani, we all know he’s a good hitter and it doesn’t happen that often, but it happens sometimes with him.”

 

GM: “What do you think is the most exciting thing about baseball?”

 

RRR: “Well, I know a lot of people like the home run and we hit a lot of those, but I like the squeeze play. I know we haven’t executed great so far this year but hopefully we can turn that around in the future.”

Me: “Ahhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh!!!”

Kevin Goldstein on Scooter

Looks like he noticed the hot start!

Scooter Gennett2B, Brewers (Double-A Huntsville): 3-for-4, 2 HR (2), 2 R, 4 RBI

All Gennett does is hit. He’s small, he doesn’t walk enough, he’s just an average runner and his defense at second base can get sloppy, but he hits. He hits everything. He hits velocity, he hits off-speed, he hits inside, he hits outside, he just barrels everything. Whether that proves to be enough is still debatable, but with a .321/.345/.472 line in his first 12 games, proving himself at the upper levels is helping his cause.”

Oh, wait, that’s from April 17th of LAST year and Kevin is now with the Astros’ front office and that .817 OPS turned into a .714 OPS when the season was all said and done. 

But hey, at least he’s off to a hot start this year too. I’m sure it’ll hold this time. 

 

Bunt Derp.

On Friday the top of the 7th started with the Brewers and Dodgers in a 3-3 tie. Alex Gonzalez led off with a single and then was derped to 2nd on a bunt by Logan Schafer (free out!). Gonzalez then scored on a single by Nori who managed to reach 3rd on Dodger incompetence, which, when you think about it, is only fair.

So with one out and a 4-3 lead the meat of the Brewer order was due up in Jean Segura and Ryan Braun. With one out and a runner on 3rd your run expectancy is about .9, which is pretty great. There’s no double play and most contact will score the guy. Plus, meat of the order!  If anything that RE number understates your run expectancy with Segura and Braun batting. a Suicide Squeeze in this situation is HUGELY risky for the following reasons:

1. Jean Segura is very good at making contact. He was very likely to put the ball in play.

2. A botched squeeze would quite possibly deny Ryan Braun the chance to bat with one and perhaps two people on base.

3. It would instead, quite possibly result in Ryan Braun leading off the 8th with the rest of the struggling lineup behind hi,

4. It did not eliminate a double play.

5. It was a one-run strategy in a game where the Dodgers still have 9 outs remaining. That’s a lot of outs.

And indeed, Jean missed and Aoki was caught coming home which seems to happen more than 10% of the time. Jean then struck out and the promising inning ended. In the inning the Brewers provided the Dodgers with 2 free outs and recorded two hits.

It would have been a dumb idea in a “low run environment” too, (like against Kershaw on Sunday) but it was really dumb in a game that was into the bullpens and had already seen 7 runs score in 7 innings.

The Brewers would go on to lose 7-4. As usual, you know it was a bad move when I’d still be criticizing it even if it had worked.

Ron did not have a good weekend.